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NOTE
ON STRICT LIABILITY CRIMES: PRESERVING A
MORAL FRAMEWORK FOR CRIMINAL INTENT IN AN
INTENT-FREE MORAL WORLD
W. Robert Thomas*
The law has long recognized a presumption against criminal strict
liability. This Note situates that presumption in terms of moral intuitions
about the role of intention and the unique nature of criminal punishment.
Two sources-recent laws from state legislatures and recent advances in
moral philosophy-pose distinct challenges to the presumption against
strict liability crimes. This Note offers a solution to the philosophical prob-
lem that informs how courts could address the legislative problem. First, it
argues that the purported problem from philosophy stems from a mistaken
relationship drawn between criminal law and morality. Second, it outlines
a slightly more nuanced moral framework that both accommodates recent
thinking in philosophy and preserves the correspondence between moral
theory and criminal law that underwrites the presumption against criminal
strict liability. Finally, it considers how the contours of this moral frame-
work could inform judicial efforts to accommodate and constrain new
criminal strict liability laws.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, Stacey Bettcher merged too slowly into an adjacent lane while
entering a poorly marked highway work zone in Michigan. Her car clipped
a construction sign, and the resulting impact killed an unseen construction
worker.' Had this tragedy occurred ten years earlier, or ten feet farther up
the highway, it would have been resolved largely through a private cause of
action. A jury would have considered whether Bettcher was negligent in
failing to merge and whether her negligence proximately caused the death.
2
1. State's Get-Tough Law on Work-Zone Speeders Gets First Court Review, BUILDING
TRADESMAN, May 2, 2003, available at http://www.detroitbuildingtrades.org/newspapr/
may22003.html#anchor88383; see also David A. Moran, Editorial, Solid Evidence: Law Is
Faulty on Construction-Zone Killings, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 7, 2003, at A11.
2. There was disagreement at trial about whether Bettcher swerved to avoid a truck
that suddenly stopped. Compare Michigan Jury Finds Woman Not Guilty in Death of Cana-
dian Highway Worker, CANADIAN PRESS, May 2, 2003, with Moran, supra note 1. As
circumstantial evidence of Bettcher's negligence, a parallel civil suit brought by a separate,
injured worker determined Bettcher to be 20 percent liable, and found C.A. Hull-the gen-
eral contractor overseeing the construction-80 percent liable for failing to correctly post
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Instead, Bettcher became the first Michigander prosecuted under Andy's
Law, which holds drivers strictly liable for a death in a work zone that oc-
curs concurrently with a "moving violation that has criminal penalties."3
Bettcher's underlying crime was violating a license restriction: she was driv-
ing a friend's car, rather than her own. 4 The state sought to convince a jury
of her peers that, even if her conduct was neither reckless nor criminally
negligent, the law nevertheless required a felony conviction with up to
fifteen years in prison.5
The law has long recognized a presumption against criminal strict liabil-
ity-the Supreme Court describes it as a "generally disfavored status"' 6-
that appears to be rooted in intuitions about the role played by defendants'
intentions in light of the uniquely stigmatic nature of criminal punishment.
Lately, that presumption has faced two seemingly unrelated challenges.
Andy's Law exemplifies the first: states are creating new strict liability
crimes that are unwarranted under the naive moral framework that justifies
the presumption. Second, prominent moral philosophers have called into
question one foundation of that framework: the role that agents' intentions
play in evaluating moral permissibility. In response, prominent criminal the-
orist Douglas Husak7 has argued that rejecting the role of intention in
evaluating moral permissibility threatens criminal law at a fundamental
level.8
This Note rejects the view that moral philosophy threatens to undermine
criminal law. In doing so, it suggests that courts adopt a method of interpret-
ing criminal strict liability laws that would be justifiable under, or at least
consistent with, the traditional moral presumption. In particular, it argues
that Husak's worry conflates the existence of some moral-criminal corre-
spondence with a particular moral-criminal correspondence. While moral
theory informs criminal law, the correct correspondence does not lie be-
tween criminal wrongdoing and moral permissibility. Rather, a connection
between criminal wrongdoing and moral blameworthiness-specifically,
Thomas Scanlon's recent account of blame-accommodates both the moral
philosopher's claim that intention is irrelevant to moral permissibility and
the criminal theorist's claim that intent is essential to criminal wrongdoing.
Part I outlines a moral framework consisting of generally accepted intui-
tions about criminal law, which underwrites a presumption against criminal
signs notifying drivers of construction. Hattan v. C.A. Hull, Inc., No. 04-11376-NI, 2005 WL
4189434, at *1 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Oct. 28, 2005) (verdict and settlement summary).
3. MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 257.601c(2) (West 2006).
4. Bitterness, Relief Follow Road Death Trial: Accused, Victim Share Nightmare That
Began with Fatal Crash, DETROIT NEWS, July 8, 2003, at AI.
5. See Woman Found Innocent in Highway Worker's Death, CHARLESTON GAZETTE
& DAILY MAIL, May 3, 2003, at 9A.
6. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978) (citations omitted).
7. See generally Douglas N. Husak Home Page, DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, http://fas-
philosophy.rutgers.edu/husak/index.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2011).
8. Douglas Husak, The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing That Intentions Are
Irrelevant to Permissibility, 3 C iM. L. & PHIL. 51, 54 (2009).
February 20121
Michigan Law Review
strict liability. It then demonstrates how the Supreme Court's criminal juris-
prudence embodies this framework. Part II introduces two challenges for
this framework. It looks first at recent state action and notices its
incompatibility with the moral framework. It then considers-by way of the
long-recognized doctrine of double effect-recent views that divorce inten-
tion from evaluations of moral permissibility, which give rise to Husak's
worry for criminal law. Part III first disarms the challenge posed by moral
philosophy. It then buttresses its defense of modem moral philosophy by
introducing a slightly more nuanced moral framework that incorporates
Thomas Scanlon's recent work on moral blame. 9 Scanlon's account of
blame demonstrates how seemingly disparate attitudes towards intent, held
by philosophers on the one hand and criminal theorists on the other, are in
fact compatible with one another. A final Section employs this nuanced
moral framework to identify a class of strict liability crimes that are, perhaps
surprisingly, morally justifiable. Ultimately, this analysis suggests one way
courts can reconcile new strict liability crimes with the original, naive moral
framework.
I. A (NAYVE) MORAL FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING
CRIMINAL STRICT LIABILITY
There is a longstanding presumption against strict liability in the arena
of criminal law. l A strict liability crime is one in which the mental state of
the accused is irrelevant as to part or all of the crime; the state need only
show that the accused "engaged in a voluntary act, or an omission to per-
form an act or duty which the accused was capable of performing."11 The
term "strict liability" encompasses both offenses for which no mental state
is required generally and offenses for which no mental state is required as to
a particular element of the crime. 2 An example of the latter is statutory
rape-an archetypal strict liability crime that requires a showing of some
mental state as to the sex act itself but treats as irrelevant whether the perpe-
trator knew or should have known about the minority of the victim.
13
9. T. M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME (2008).
10. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994) ("[O]ffenses that require no
mens rea generally are disfavored...." (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426
(1985))); Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 437 ("[lIntent generally remains an indispensable element of
a criminal offense.").
11. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 132 (2008). Volition, which might have been
thought to be a mental state, is nevertheless treated as part of a crime's actus reus. E.g., State
v. Utter, 479 P2d 946, 951 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
12. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.5 (2d ed. 2003). The
Model Penal Code identifies four types of culpable mental states: purpose, knowledge, reck-
lessness, and negligence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
13. See LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 5.5. To avoid the fuzzy margins of statutory rape
doctrine and the line-drawing problems they engender, this Note uses as an illustration statu-
tory rape only of victims of obvious minority. By way of example, the Model Penal Code
suggests victims under the age of ten would fall into this category. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.1(d).
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Admittedly, strict liability has its place in modem law-indeed, it even has a
narrowly delimited place in criminal law. 4 Proof problems, for example,
motivate the creation of strict liability laws. 5 In these settings courts and
legislatures worry that a significant number of innocent parties will suffer
unless a class of actors is made strictly liable for certain actions.16 In addi-
tion, strict liability is employed-particularly in tort law-to constrain
behavior vicariously or to deter particularly dangerous conduct. 17 Neverthe-
less, the law has long recognized a general presumption, albeit not without
exception, against strict liability in criminal law. 18
Section L.A introduces, by way of background, terminology that will
appear throughout this Note. As the remainder of the Part argues, the pre-
sumption against criminal strict liability can be grounded in what this Note
refers to as a moral framework that considers both the moral importance of
agents' intentions and the justifications underlying state-sponsored social
stigmatization. After introducing a naive moral framework based on these
two intuitions about criminal law, this Part reviews the Supreme Court's
strict liability jurisprudence. It concludes that the Court's decisions are con-
sistent with the presumption emerging from the naive moral framework,
while several exceptions to the Court's default presumption can be under-
stood to be nevertheless consistent with the presumption's underlying
rationales.
A. Precursors: Moral-Criminal Correspondence,
Frameworks, and Two Moral Bases
The following paragraphs sketch the overarching dialectic and define
some jargon appearing in this Note. This Note assumes that there exists
some correspondence between morality and criminal law such that moral
principles underlie classic, deep-rooted principles of criminal law. To be
clear, this Note does not endorse a strong view that all criminal laws are
14. See generally Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I1l-The Rise and
Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REv. 337 (1989) (discussing justifications for
instances of criminal strict liability).
15. LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 5.5.
16. For a classic statement of the motivations for strict products liability, see Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concur-
ring). But see Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REv.
731, 739-40 (1960) (complicating justifications of strict liability as a deterrent in the context
of criminal law). For an analysis of the burden-shifting effect strict liability rules have on
prosecutors, see Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability
Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 401,421 (1993).
17. E.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968) (re-
spondeat superior); Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31, 32-34 (N.Y. 1969) (ultrahazardous
activities).
18. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605-06 (1994) ("[W]e must construe
[statutes] in light of the background rules of the common law... in which the requirement of
some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded." (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422,436-37 (1978))).
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grounded on and explained by particular corresponding moral edicts; the
correspondence between criminal law and moral theory need not be one-to-
one or even especially tight. 9 However, the weaker and decidedly more
modest claim is that moral principles underlie classic, deep-rooted intuitions
about the retributive nature of criminal law. 20 That is, some functions map
from moral theory's domain to criminal law such that principles in the lat-
ter-deep-seated intuitions without which our discourse about criminal
theory would suffer greatly 2 1 -can be justified by principles in the former.
As will be shown, the presumption against criminal strict liability is rooted
in just such intuitions.
22
In order to map from the moral to the legal, there must be some moral
basis from which to begin. This Note contrasts two possible candidates for
the class of moral bases that justify criminal law; these moral concepts pro-
duce very different outcomes for the moral-criminal correspondence. The
first concept, moral permissibility, is discussed by modem philosophers in
the context of intent and by Douglas Husak in the context of philosophical
challenges to criminal theory; discussions of moral permissibility feature
prominently in Sections II.B and III.A. The second moral basis is that of
Scanlonian blame, which is a particular understanding of blameworthiness
rooted in the meaning of one's actions as it affects the relationship between
the actor and the offended party. Because Scanlon develops his account of
blame to contrast moral permissibility, discussion of moral blame will be the
focus of Section III.B.
This Note further tries to identify an appropriate moral-criminal corre-
spondence by looking at two distinct moral frameworks upon which
criminal principles are justifiable.23 These moral frameworks are meant to
show how the moral domain maps onto criminal law; they illustrate a causal
pathway from an abstract moral concept to its corresponding criminal theo-
ry considerations. This Part first considers a nave moral framework, which
consists of common and oft-discussed normative intuitions underlying and
motivating criminal law. The remainder of this Part outlines the naive moral
framework and describes how that framework--or something like it-
underwrites the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on criminal strict liability.
Only when the naive moral framework is found to be too underdeveloped to
19. See, e.g., Alec Walen, Comments on Doug Husak: The Low Cost of Recognizing
(and of Ignoring) the Limited Relevance of Intentions to Permissibility, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL.
71, 72-73 (2009) (pointing out that legal norms are less particularized than are moral
norms). Walen raises separate objections to Husak's critique of modem moral philosophy;
his particular objections are not the subject of this Note.
20. LaFave calls these "basic premises." See generally LAFAVE, supra note 12,
§ 1.2(b).
21. Consider the view that prominent criticism of criminal practice falls flat without
some reference to normative bases.
22. See infra Section I.B.
23. The term moral framework is not meant to import technical meaning or do any
special conceptual work; rather, the term serves as a placeholder for the set of relevant moral
principles that correspond with and motivate criminal law.
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allow for meaningful distinctions does this Note introduce an alternative
framework called the nuanced moral framework. Part I1 explores this nu-
anced moral framework, which is compatible with the naive framework but
allows for more subtle distinctions when seeking a moral-criminal
correspondence.
B. Two Intuitions Motivating the Presumption
against Criminal Strict Liability
Accepting that some moral principles generally underlie classic, deep-
rooted principles of criminal law, this Section introduces two normative
intuitions that are commonly referred to as core aspects of criminal law and
that underlie the presumption against criminal strict liability in particular.
Together, these two principles represent the naive moral framework, as
contrasted with the nuanced moral framework sketched in Section III.A.2.
Consider each element of the naive moral framework below.
First is the role played by intention, broadly understood,24 in explaining
when and to what degree state action is appropriate. The importance of in-
tention to law is nothing new; that a party should not be punished because
of actions beyond his control is a broad claim that has purchase on all
laws-or, at least, the common law and historical criminal law2 5-and is
rooted in Western conceptions of free will. Of course, this is not an absolute
claim, since the benefits of strict liability can and do sometimes outweigh
the tendency to require the showing of an agent's mental state.16 Neverthe-
less, the underlying notion of free will remains fundamental to criminal law,
and the law has treated this moral standard as a presumption that needs to be
overcome.
27
Second-and accompanying the role of intention-is the claim that the
criminal law uniquely empowers state-sponsored sanctions intended to
stigmatize and punish. Beyond the importance of intent generally, the
uniquely stigmatic nature of criminal punishment makes it unlikely that the
benefits of strict liability would ever be taken to outweigh the importance of
24. This Note focuses on a broad notion of intent, viz., intentions as an individual's
reasons for action. Criminal law also considers intention as a subset of mens rea, to be dis-
tinguished from knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02
(1962). This Note does not consider this latter sense of intention. The broader notion of in-
tent fits with the Supreme Court's sweeping pronouncements. See infra Section I.C. It also
jibes with what moral philosophers have in mind. See generally G.E.M. ANScOMBE, INTEN-
TION 9 (Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 2000) (1957) (distinguishing between "intention of doing
[an act]" and "intention in doing it").
25. E.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1957) (striking down a law that
penalized convicts without notice); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1 (1962) ("This
position [against strict liability] ... is superimposed on the entire corpus of the law .....
See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-6 (2d ed. 2008).
26. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
27. It is far beyond the scope of this Note to consider whether and to what extent the
centrality of free will in criminal theory-much less in Western thought-is well-founded.
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free will in the forum of criminal law.2" A common view is that criminal
punishment (especially incarceration) is justified-indeed, even defined-
by the particular quality of stigma it imposes on felons.29 The Model Penal
Code, in launching a "frontal attack" on strict liability crimes, claims that
any case of criminal strict liability would be "indefensible, unless reduced to
terms that insulate conviction from the type of moral condemnation that is
and ought to be implicit when a sentence of probation or imprisonment may
be imposed."30 The notion of desert---of punishment earned--demarcates
criminal punishment from the rest of law.3
At issue are two normative principles: a deep-rooted respect for Western
notions of free will and intention and an understanding of criminal punish-
ment as uniquely stigmatizing or condemnatory relative to other state
sanctions. Working together, these principles constitute a moral frame-
work-which this Note identifies as the naive moral framework-that bars,
or at least strongly disfavors, the incorporation of strict liability into the
practice of criminal law.
C. The Supreme Court's Interpretive Presumption
against Criminal Strict Liability
The Supreme Court's criminal strict liability jurisprudence supports and
reinforces the naive moral framework's normative presumption against
criminal strict liability. First, this Section outlines what can best be de-
scribed as the Court's interpretive jurisprudence. Because the Court must
balance its own intuitions about the nature of criminal law against the clear
intent of Congress, it interprets statutes to avoid creating strict liability
crimes in a variety of cases. After outlining this interpretive jurisprudence,
this Section suggests that the majority of exceptions recognized by the
Court can be understood as compatible with the naYve moral framework; no
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1 ("[I]f practical enforcement precludes litigation
of the culpability of alleged deviation from legal requirements, the enforcers cannot rightly
demand the use of penal sanctions for the purpose.... This is too fundamental to be com-
promised.").
29. For a small sampling of scholars echoing this sentiment, see DOUGLAS HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 12 (2008) ("[P]unishments deter
partly through the stigmatizing effects of a criminal conviction."); Gordon Hawkins, Punish-
ment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and Habituative Effects, in THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT 163, 168 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971) ("That punishment is effective in con-
veying social reprobation is clearly reflected in the stigmatization and the loss of social
status commonly involved in criminal punishment."); and Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) ("What distinguishes a criminal
from a civil sanction . .. is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies
and justifies its imposition.").
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1.
31. Take the classic distinction between incarceration and commitment to illustrate the
uniquely condemnatory quality of criminal sanction. See, e.g., ELYN R. SAKS WITH STEPHEN
H. BEHNKE, JEKYLL ON TRIAL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW 158
(1997) (identifying the stigma of criminal wrongdoing as more obvious than the stigma of
mental illness, even where mental illness suggests a danger to society).
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class of exceptions involves situations that activate both of the moral intui-
tions that made strict liability crimes unjustifiable in the first place.
1. A General Judicial Presumption against Criminal Strict Liability
The Supreme Court has identified a morally laden, historical disfavor of
strict liability crimes that continues to influence its jurisprudence, particular-
ly with respect to crimes that derive from or look like traditional crimes.
32
The Court famously described the requirement of a mens rea as follows:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persis-
tent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between
good and evil.33
In the same context, the Court referred to the showing of a culpable state of
mind as an "ancient requirement."34 By at least the time of Blackstone, it
was seen as essential that criminal convictions reflect the presence of "a
vicious will" in the accused.35 This view "took deep and early root in Amer-
ican soil,"36 with the result that strict liability remained virtually nonexistent
at common law.37 The sentiment expressed in Morissette v. United States
that intention is "no provincial or transient notion"3 continues to guide the
Court's criminal strict liability jurisprudence.39
Yet notwithstanding this strong language, the Court has never recog-
nized an all-out ban on criminal strict liability. Far from it, the Court has
repeatedly affirmed that strict liability crimes are not per se unconstitution-
al.' This is because, though the Court has expressed its suspicion of
criminal strict liability, it must weigh its reluctance against its constitutional
responsibility to effectuate the will of Congress.41 Barring some finding of a
32. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) ("We start
with the familiar proposition that '[tlhe existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the
exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951))).
33. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
34. Id.
35. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21 (explaining that all excuses to
crimes reduce to a want or defect of will).
36. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.
37. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922) ("[Tlhe general rule at
common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of
every crime ....").
38. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250.
39. E.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994); Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419,425-26 (1985); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978).
40. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256-57; Balint, 258 U.S. at 250.
41. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) ("There is wide latitude in the
lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from
its definition."). The same holds for state legislatures. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545
February 20121
Michigan Law Review
constitutional violation, the Court must uphold the will of the legislature in
creating strict liability crimes.42 Rather than adopt a substantive jurispru-
dence that bars the expansion of strict liability crimes, the Court has instead
created and relied upon an interpretive jurisprudence, according to which it
presumes that the legislature shares its belief in some type of moral-
criminal correspondence. 43 The Court routinely interprets statutes to avoid
finding an actual strict liability crime,' often reading into statutes a mens
rea requirement where none existed previously.45 One particularly clear ex-
ample occurred in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. ,46 where the Court
found a statutory mens rea requirement even when doing so required repeat-
edly violating basic rules of grammar.47 The Court, it seems, is willing to
apply its interpretive presumption as necessary to obviate criminal strict
liability.
2. The Court's Principled Exception for Public Welfare Offenses
Notwithstanding its general efforts to construe statutes to find a mens
rea requirement, the Court recognizes in its interpretive jurisprudence two
classes of exceptions to its presumptive disfavor of criminal strict liability.
The first class is for regulatory offenses. The second is for offenses involv-
ing inherently dangerous items or conduct. Together, these exceptions fall
under the broader term public welfare offenses.18 Insofar as these exceptions
(1968) (Black, J., concurring) ("[L]egislatures have always been allowed wide freedom to
determine the extent to which moral culpability should be a prerequisite to conviction of a
crime.").
42. According to LaFave, only in Lambert has the Supreme Court found a lack of a
statutory mens rea requirement to violate constitutional due process. LAFAVE, supra note 12,
§ 5.5, at 388-89 & n.25.
43. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 n.3 ("By interpreting such public welfare offenses to
require at least that the defendant know that he is dealing with some dangerous or deleterious
substance, we have avoided construing criminal statutes to impose a rigorous form of strict
liability." (citing United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563-64
(1971))); Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 437 (holding that Morissette established "an interpretative
presumption that mens rea is required").
44. See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004); United States v. X-Citement Vid-
eo, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994); Staples, 511 U.S. 600; Morissette, 342 U.S. 246.
45. See, e.g., Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 (explaining that congressional silence as to
mens rea does not preclude the Court from finding such a requirement).
46. 513 U.S. 64.
47. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 76-78. For a flavor, see id. at 83 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("It is really quite extraordinary for the Court, fresh from having, as it says,
'emancipated' the adverb from the grammatical restriction .... to insist that the demands of
syntax must prevail over legislative intent-thus producing an end result that accords neither
with syntax nor with supposed intent." (citation omitted)).
48. While the Court prefers the blanket term "public welfare offenses," it is analytical-
ly useful to split the two apart. Cf. Wasserstrom, supra note 16, at 732 ("[S]trict liability
offenses [ought] not be confused with Sayre's 'public welfare' offenses, i.e., those which he
defines as essentially regulative in function and punishable by fine rather than imprisonment.
This inquiry is concerned with ... cases in which the prescribed sentences are surely not
minimal in degree or merely regulative in function.").
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do not activate at least one of the two moral bases that make strict liability
unjustifiable, 49 these classes represent caveats to the general presumption of
the naYve moral framework.
Consider first regulatory offenses. Because they do not stigmatize guilty
parties, regulatory offenses are no more of a concern in the context of strict
liability than other noncriminal offenses. As may be divined from the name,
regulatory offenses are acts in which criminalization serves a regulatory
function.50 These offenses are distinguished by the fact that serious punish-
ment generally does not accompany them-fines are common, while jail
time is rare and very limited-and as such they lack a heavy notion of social
stigma.5 This amounts to saying that regulatory offenses lack a defining
element of the moral framework that distinguishes criminal laws in the first
place.52 Without the serious stigma, there is little reason to worry that regu-
latory offenses fail to violate moral intuitions about what makes a crime
culpable; they do not carry the special burden that makes strict liability pre-
sumptively off limits to criminal law. Regulatory offenses, then, are a
consistent departure from the naYve moral framework's mens rea require-
ment for criminal law.
The Court also recognizes the regulation of activities that are inherently
dangerous as an exception to a criminal mens rea requirement. 3 Inherently
dangerous offenses defy the claim that an agent could not have known his
actions were ones for which state punishment was a likely outcome.54 The
guiding intuition here is that sometimes a party is presumptively on notice
of his potential culpability simply by choosing to undergo certain dangerous
activities.55 In essence, society denies that a functioning individual could in
49. See supra Section I.A.
50. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 442 (1978) ("The criminal sanc-
tions [under regulatory offenses] would be used, not to punish conscious and calculated
wrongdoing at odds with statutory proscriptions, but instead simply to regulate business
practices regardless of the intent with which they were undertaken.").
51. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) ("[Strict liability] penalties
commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender's reputa-
tion."); see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994) ("[T]he penalty imposed under
a statute has been a significant consideration in determining whether the statute should be
construed as dispensing with mens rea.").
52. One could hold that these aren't really crimes in some important sense. This Note
takes a softer view-namely, that the lack of a mens rea for public welfare offenses doesn't
violate core notions of criminal desert because the lack of stigma means that the generally
high standards for what constitutes criminal punishment aren't activated.
53. E.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (hand grenades); United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922) (illegal narcotics).
54. Staples, 511 U.S. at 611 ("[C]oncem for criminalizing ostensibly innocuous con-
duct is inapplicable whenever an item is sufficiently dangerous-that is, dangerousness alone
should alert an individual to probable regulation and justify treating a statute that regulates
the dangerous device as dispensing with mens rea.").
55. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (upholding strict liability
crimes for conduct that "a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regu-
lation and may seriously threaten the community's health or safety").
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principle be acting accidentally (even if, in fact, they were) in cases
involving inherently dangerous activities. The possession of unregistered
hand grenades, for example, is an inherently dangerous activity.5 6 Statutory
rape of someone of obvious minority, long held to be a strict liability
offense,57 is also a classic example of inherently dangerous activity. Defend-
ants are on notice when engaging in sexual activity with young
people. 8 In that setting, the Court is willing to impute some degree of inten-
tional conduct to actors.
To summarize, the Court has recognized a class of clearly delineated ex-
ceptions to its presumption against criminal strict liability. Both of these
exceptions-what this Note calls regulatory offenses and inherently danger-
ous actions-are brought together under the broad umbrella of public
welfare offense doctrine. By addressing the two separately, it becomes clear
why both constitute principled exceptions to the presumption against strict
liability: each fails to satisfy one of the two crucial moral intuitions that
speak against criminal strict liability. Despite being strict liability crimes,
public welfare offenses are nevertheless compatible with the naive moral
framework's presumption against criminal strict liability.
II. Two CHALLENGES FOR THE PRESUMPTION
AGAINST CRIMINAL STRICT LIABILITY
The presumption against criminal strict liability is a moral principle. Or
better put, it is a principle of law that depends largely on its correspondence
with an underlying moral theory, as embodied for now by the naive moral
framework. However, the presumption against strict liability faces two chal-
lenges. First, state legislatures are creating new strict liability crimes that are
incongruent with the naive moral framework and that cannot be readily
classified within one of the Court's principled exceptions. At the same time
and in a different arena, moral philosophers are calling into question a par-
ticular relationship between intention and moral permissibility, which has
the potential to undermine one plank of the naive moral framework that
justifies the presumption against criminal strict liability. This Part introduces
the tensions arising from state legislation on the one hand and moral philos-
ophy on the other. Section II.A introduces several examples that highlight
two types of recently created strict liability crimes that are inconsistent with
the naive moral framework. Section II.B introduces a recent critique in mor-
al philosophy of the relationship between intention and moral permissibility.
56. See Freed, 401 U.S. 601. The Freed Court held there was no need to prove whether
a defendant knew his hand grenades were unregistered because "one would hardly be sur-
prised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act." Id. at 609.
57. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n.8 (1952).
58. For a view that statutory rape is instead actually a regulatory offense exception,
see Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Of-
fense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 313, 332-33 (2003) (arguing that statutory rape made sense
as a public welfare offense when a large number of sexual activities were criminalized).
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The critique is especially troubling because, on Husak's account, it threatens
to critically undermine the moral framework justifying criminal punishment.
A. The Challenge Posed by State Legislatures
State legislatures have, in recent years, shown an eagerness to create
new strict liability crimes that are neither consistent with the naYve moral
framework nor easily classifiable as public welfare offenses. Frequently,
legislators are motivated by the perceived need to respond to some particu-
lar injustice; as discussed earlier,59 often the goal is to make punishment
more easily available to prosecutors in hard cases. 60 Strict liability crimes,
once in place, can be difficult to repeal. Though some state judiciaries adopt
an approach to criminal strict liability similar to that of the Supreme Court,
61
others are more willing to allow strict liability crimes. 62 Still other courts-
as seen in the following Sections-are unwilling to stretch interpretations as
far as the Supreme Court does. The effect of this is to limit the judiciary's
ability to reinterpret a given rule in a way that accommodates a mens rea
requirement.
The expansion of criminal strict liability is especially prevalent in two
settings. First, states have expanded strict liability in cases in which there is
some underlying conduct that, though incidental to the criminal act facing
prosecution, is nevertheless deemed socially unacceptable. In this setting,
states are making the accused strictly liable for one offense because he
committed a second, unrelated crime. Second, states have made felons
strictly liable for enhanced punishments when the underlying crime is minor
but the outcome happens to be unexpectedly obvious. In particular,
legislatures have targeted offenses that are in and of themselves relatively
harmless but nonetheless result in death. In this second setting, states are
creating an enhanced punishment for the same offense because of an unusu-
ally bad outcome. The following Sections provide real-world examples of
each type of strict liability crime.
63
1. Unrelated Conduct Crimes
Strict liability is increasingly popular in situations involving unwanted
conduct that connects to an underlying bad outcome (again, usually death).
The felony murder rule is the paradigmatic case of punishing related con-
duct: it holds that a party to certain crimes is strictly liable for deaths
59. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Bitterness, Relief Follow Road Death Trial: Accused, Victim Share
Nightmare That Began with Fatal Crash, supra note 4. Andy's Law was created in response
to a drunk driver's crash into a construction zone; despite paralyzing a worker, the driver
served a forty-five day sentence. Id.
61. See, e.g., In re Jorge M., 4 P.3d 297 (Cal. 2000).
62. See infra notes 76, 80-81 and accompanying text.
63. Discussion of whether, in practice, courts can reliably identify laws as either unre-
lated conduct crimes or enhanced punishment crimes is reserved for Section III.B.
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occurring during or as a result of those crimes.64 Long the bte noir of
criminal theorists, 65 felony murder has shown resistance to reform in a ma-
jority of jurisdictions. 66 Perhaps as a compromise, most states recognize a
variety of either legislative or judicial limitations. For example, most felony
murder laws only attach to certain "inherently dangerous" crimes,67 and
cannot be applied where homicide merges with the underlying crime.
68
But punishing individuals for unrelated bad conduct is not exclusive to
felony murder. As seen, Andy's Law makes drivers strictly liable for any
vehicle-related death that occurs inside a work zone, provided the driver
concomitantly committed another driving offense with criminal penalties.
69
Insofar as many such driving offenses-for example, driving with a restrict-
ed license-are themselves strict liability offenses, Andy's Law has the
effect of making drivers strictly liable for the crime of killing a worker in-
side a construction zone.7" Moreover, it does not seem possible to categorize
this law as one of the established exceptions to criminal strict liability.
Andy's Law is certainly not regulatory in nature; the harsh punishment it
imposes strongly suggests the opposite. Nor does it seem accurate to de-
scribe driving a car as an inherently dangerous activity akin to handling
hand grenades.7
Beyond driving accidents, drug-related accidents too are a popular target
for criminal strict liability.72 This is true even in cases where the connection
to drug use (or production) seems, at best, tenuously connected to the under-
lying wrongful act. New Jersey has for the past two decades held parties
64. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 65 (2008).
65. Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965,
966 & n.3 (2008) (setting forth an extensive list of recent criticisms of the felony murder
rule). However, at least one criminal theorist has argued in favor of the felony murder rule.
Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075,
1121-24 (1997) (defending the rule as negligence for inherently dangerous felonies).
66. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.06[A], at 521-22 (5th
ed. 2009).
67. See State v. Kyles, 607 A.2d 355, 367 (Conn. 1992). For example, the Supreme
Court of California has placed substantial limitations on its judge-made felony murder doc-
trine. People v. Howard, 104 P.3d 107, 113-14 (Cal. 2005).
68. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 891 (Cal. 1984). The fact that felony
murder can't merge with the underlying crime confirms that it is a case of punishing actors
for an unrelated offense.
69. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text; MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.601c
(West 2006).
70. See Moran, supra note 1.
71. In United States v. Staples, the Court distinguished gun ownership from the pos-
session of grenades. 511 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1994). Instead, the Court analogized gun
ownership to car ownership precisely because it thought that car ownership was not inherent-
ly dangerous. See id. at 614.
72. There is some reason to think that drugs are inherently dangerous objects under
the Court's jurisprudence. See id. at 610 (suggesting that the Court's decision Balint was
motivated by the fact that drugs are dangerous). Nevertheless, this is no objection in this
particular setting; the issue here is not the possession or sale of drugs per se, but rather con-
duct concurrent with-but substantially unrelated to-drug use.
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strictly liable for drug-related deaths.7 3 Any party involved in manufactur-
ing, distributing, or dispensing Class I or Class H1 substances is strictly and
criminally liable for any death the proximate cause of which is the drug in
question.74 The law has come under scrutiny for punishing drug dealers,
whose underlying crime of providing drugs is entirely disconnected from
the death that results.75 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has
declined to read in a mens rea requirement; instead, it has upheld the strict
liability status of the law.
76
Likewise, Michigan is one of several states to have criminalized operat-
ing a vehicle with the presence of any illicit substances. 77 In Michigan, any
detectable level of a number of Schedule 1 drugs is sufficient to commit this
strict liability crime, which comes with a fifteen-year prison sentence. 78 Un-
til June of 2010, a positive test for marijuana metabolites alone established
liability for this crime, notwithstanding the fact that metabolites remain pre-
sent in the human body for weeks following ingestion.79 While Michigan's
Supreme Court rolled back this particularly abusive application of the law,
in doing so it upheld the strict liability elements of the law itself.80 As a re-
sult, Michigan law continues to punish parties, even where those individuals
are not legally impaired as drivers.8
2. Enhanced Punishment Crimes
Punishing unrelated conduct is only one way that states enshrine strict
liability. While the application of Andy's Law allows for extreme outcomes
in some cases--even purely accidental outcomes are criminalized-states
frequently use strict liability to bootstrap serious crimes for which a sub-
stantially higher mens rea would otherwise be required into minor
misconduct. Often, these cases involve underlying crimes in which death
results.
Texas, for example, created an enhanced penalty for nonforceful evasion
of arrest that results in a police officer's death.82 Prior to the enhanced
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2005).
74. Id.
75. See Laurie L. Levenson, Are Drug Dealers Killers?, NAT'L L.J. (Nov. 21, 2005),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNL.jsp?id=900005441517.
76. See State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1170-77 (N.J. 1994).
77. Micu. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(8) (West 2006). Other states include Arizona,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wiscon-
sin. See Donna Leinwand, Growing Danger: Drugged Driving, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 2004,
at Al.
78. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(8)-(9).
79. Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets: Cannabis/Marijuana (A9-
Tetrahydrocannabinol, THC), NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://
www.nhtsa.gov/people/lnjury/researchljob 1 85drugs/cannabis.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2011).
80. People v. Feezel, 783 N.W.2d 67 (Mich. 2010).
81. Id. at 79-80 (citing People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822, 832 (Mich. 2006)).
82. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(b) (West 2011).
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penalty's enactment, "evading arrest" was a Class B misdemeanor with a
maximum sentence of 180 days; the current law mandates 2 to 20 years of
incarceration. 3 Meanwhile, Delaware holds drivers strictly liable for caus-
ing a death while committing a traffic offense. 84 Although the state identifies
the crime as a misdemeanor, it nevertheless carries a maximum sentence of
30 months in prison." Recent case law confirms that this crime of "operat-
ing a vehicle causing death" is indeed intended to be a strict liability
crime.86 And following Apprendi v. New Jersey,87 Illinois began to convert
several of its statutory presumptions into strict liability elements. For exam-
ple, Illinois's new strict liability crime-aggravated DUI-replaced the
reckless homicide presumption for drunk driving; drunk drivers are now
automatically guilty, without a showing of fault in the underlying accident,
if "great bodily harm" befalls a nondriver.
88
To be clear, objecting to state action here does not entail that agents who
bring about death by their actions should walk away with impunity. The
underlying preexisting offense will still be there for a jury to decide, and the
relevant circumstances will inform the severity of civil punishment where
appropriate. The concern with strict liability for enhanced punishments,
however, is that the social stigma and physical suffering associated with
criminal conviction and incarceration is excessive, and thus morally inap-
propriate, for a mild offense.89
B. The Challenge Posed by Moral Philosophy
Thus far, the presumption against criminal strict liability is a principle of
law that depends largely on its correspondence with an underlying moral
theory, as embodied by a naYve moral framework consisting of intuitions
about both the nature of criminal punishment and the intentions of agents.9
It looks troubling, then, when recent work in moral philosophy takes the
83. Gerald S. Reamey, The Growing Role of Fortuity in Texas Criminal Law, 47 S.
TEx. L. REV. 59, 87 (2005).
84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4176A (West 2005).
85. Id. The length of incarceration belies the notion that this is a misdemeanor in any
serious sense; misdemeanors are traditionally capped at a maximum sentence of one year.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(4) (1962).
86. Hoover v. State, 958 A.2d 816, 820 (Del. 2008).
87. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi, the Court held that any factual element that
may affect sentencing must be decided by a jury.
88. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 11-501(d) (West 2008); Theodore A. Gottfried &
Peter G. Baroni, Presumptions, Inferences, and Strict Liability in Illinois Law: Preempting
the Presumption of Innocence?, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 715, 738-39 (2008). Ironically, this
statute was created because the Illinois Supreme Court worried that a statutory presumption
that drunk drivers were criminally reckless would unconstitutionally deny those drivers their
right to a presumption of innocence. Id. at 737; see People v. Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d 784, 791
(Ill. 2003).
89. Cf. Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Accidents happen, but they seldom give rise to criminal liability.").
90. See supra Section I.B.
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position that agents' intentions are irrelevant to determining whether the
underlying action was itself permissible. Indeed, Douglas Husak suggests
that accepting the irrelevance of intention to moral permissibility would re-
quire reconceptualizing core elements of our criminal practice.
This Part introduces, by way of the doctrine of double effect, recent
philosophical debate over the role played by intentions in assessing moral
permissibility. It then considers Husak's concern: critics of double effect
embrace a view of intention that fundamentally conflicts with one of the
two intuitions underwriting criminal law generally and the naYve moral
framework in particular.
1. The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Growing
Irrelevance of Intentions
Appreciating the concern raised by moral philosophy requires consider-
ing the doctrine of double effect ("DDE"). DDE is a longstanding91 and
widespread view in moral philosophy that "sometimes it is permissible to
cause such a harm as a side effect (or "double effect") of bringing about a
good result even though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as
a means to bringing about the same good end."92 To make this clear, consid-
er an example drawn from the philosophical literature that reflects current
reasoning in international humanitarian law.9 3 Compare a terrorist bomber to
a military pilot, both of whom release explosives that cause the death of
civilians. 94 The pilot intends to blow up, say, a military base; nevertheless,
collateral damage from this bombing will foreseeably kill innocent civilians.
The terrorist, by contrast, intends to kill innocent civilians in order to sap his
enemies' morale. While both bombers may end up killing the same number
of civilians in completing their missions, DDE suggests the terrorist is the
91. Various formulations of DDE have been central to Catholic reasoning since the
writings of Thomas Aquinas. 3 THOMAS AQUINAS, Of Murder, in THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA
OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS pt. 1I-II q. 64, art. 7 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1911); see also F.J. CONNELL, Double Effect, Principle of,
in 4 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 880, 880-81 (Berard L. Marthaler et al. eds., Gale 2d
ed. 2003) (1967).
92. Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 7,
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/.
93. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict art. 48, adopted on
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I].
94. One of many formulations of this example can be attributed to Judith Jarvis Thom-
son, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 292-93 (1991). For an excellent recap of
the DDE debate, along with many of the standard examples in the literature, see T.A.




morally worse of the two because he intends to kill civilians, whereas the
military pilot does not intend admittedly foreseeable deaths.95
DDE reasoning appears outside of the international law context. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court explicitly adopted a DDE-style approach in
Vacco v. Quill, which took up the distinction between "terminal sedation"
and "physician-assisted suicide."96 On the Court's view, terminal sedation
may be foreseeably fatal to the patient, but doctors administering such seda-
tion intend to ease the patient's suffering and do not intend to euthanize
their patient.97 By contrast, assisted suicide requires intent to cause death.
Ultimately, the Court upheld the two actions as legally distinct, and found
that while terminal sedation was legally permissible, assisted suicide was
not. DDE-style justifications continue to prove popular in medical settings,
where a single treatment may simultaneously produce a beneficial outcome
and a destructive one.
98
2. Modem Skepticism to DDE
DDE has recently come under increasingly heavy fire from an intellec-
tual position whose critique threatens to affect the naive moral framework. 99
Critics have posed a barrage of thought experiments-most notably, Judith
Jarvis Thompson's "Loop Problem"-meant to show that the work done by
the intent/foresight distinction, while appealing, is nevertheless wrong.'°
They argue that the intentions behind an agent's actions do not determine
whether that action is morally permissible. 0 1 By one estimate, a majority of
95. But see Thomson, supra note 94, at 293 ("Can anyone really think that the pilot
should decide whether he may drop the bombs by looking inward for the intention with
which he would be dropping them if he dropped them?").
96. 521 U.S. 793, 807 n.11(1997).
97. Many of the scholars mentioned in this Note entered an amicus brief on the issue
of DDE. Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 95-1858), Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708956. For further criticism of Vacco and a discussion of the
implicit role played by DDE in American jurisprudence, see Edward C. Lyons, In Incogni-
to-the Principle of Double Effect in American Constitutional Law, 57 FLA. L. REV. 469
(2005).
98. E.g., Susan Anderson Fohr, The Double Effect of Pain Medication: Separating
Myth from Reality, 1 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 315 (1998).
99. DDE has long been a target of criticism, most notably for what is referred to as the
"closeness problem." E.g., JONATHAN BENNETT, THE ACT ITSELF (1995); Philippa Foot, The
Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in KILLING AND LETTING DIE
266 (Bonnie Steinbock & Alastair Norcross eds., 2d ed. 1994); H.L.A. HART, Intention and
Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 25, at 113. This Note does not
consider discussions of DDE beyond the critique introduced in this Section.
100. This Note avoids the endless discussion of "trolley problem" hypotheticals. For
those interested in the details of Thomson's "looping variant" and its application to DDE, see
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Comment, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1401-03 (1985).
101. This is not to say that DDE's explanations of examples like terrorist/pilot, see
supra Section II.B.1, are not appealing. Rather, recent critics have focused on giving ac-
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moral philosophers subscribe to some variant of an account of moral action
in which intent is irrelevant to the moral calculus of an agent's actions.
I0 2
The accuracy of this estimate notwithstanding, a surprising number of
prominent philosophers agree that an agent's intentions are not, as DDE
suggests, the determinate factor of moral permissibility.
Looking through the recent philosophical literature, one finds notable
philosophers agreeing with this critique. Several critics trace their argu-
ments back to a 1980 Tanner Lecture by philosopher of language Jonathan
Bennett, who claimed as follows:
[I]t is a mistake to think of first-order morality-morality for the guidance
of deliberating agents-as making any use of the concept of the delibera-
tor's future intentions. The morality I consult as a guide to my conduct
does also guide my intentions, but not by telling me what I may or may not
intend. It speaks to me of what I may or may not do, and of what are or are
not good reasons for various kinds of action .... 1
03
Extending Bennett's analysis, renowned moral philosopher Judith Jarvis
Thompson claimed that "what an agent intends (as opposed to merely fore-
seeing) in acting is irrelevant to the moral permissibility or impermissibility
of his action.' ' °4 Ethicist Matthew Hanser has suggested that arguments
against the role of intentions in DDE extend to analysis of moral permissi-
bility broadly. °5 Finally, prominent moral and political philosopher Thomas
Scanlon-whose distinction between permissibility and blame features
prominently in Part HI-recently described intentions as important "only in
a derivative way."'1 6 Scanlon said further, "In explaining why certain actions
are impermissible, people often refer to intent-to an agent's reasons for
acting-when in fact what makes these actions wrong is the considerations
that count against it, not the agent's view of those considerations." 107 Re-
gardless if this is the majority position of moral philosophers, the rejection
of the role played by intention-at least in the context of DDE-is support-
ed by prominent figures in the moral philosophy community.
counts of why DDE appears appealing in these examples while at the same time rejecting it.
See infra Section III.A.2 for one such account.
102. Husak, supra note 8, at 52-53. But see Walen, supra note 19, at 72-73 (arguing
that few, if any, philosophers agree with Husak's characterization of the problem).
103. Jonathan Bennett, Keynote Address at the Oxford University's Tanner Lectures on
Human Values: Morality and Consequences 97 (May 9, 16 & 23, 1980), available at
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/bennett81 .pdf.
104. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments, 109
ETHIcs 497, 516 n.18 (1999).
105. Matthew Hanser, Permissibility and Practical Inference, 115 ETHICS 443, 454
(2005) ("Although one cannot ... refute the formal thesis that intentions are relevant to per-
missibility simply by refuting the principle of double effect, some of the familiar objections
to the principle of double effect are also objections to the formal thesis.").
106. SCANLON, supra note 9, at 40.
107. Id. at 37.
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3. How the Critique of DDE Threatens to Undermine Criminal Law
Rejecting a relationship between intent and moral permissibility may ef-
fectively disarm DDE. But as Husak points out, there is no easy way to
cabin the rejection of intention in the DDE setting from the rejection of it in
other conceptual analyses of moral wrongdoing. 0 8 Husak focuses particu-
larly on the effect that divorcing intention from moral permissibility would
have on theories of criminal law. For the purposes of this Note, if Husak's
concern is correct, then modem moral philosophy threatens a core element
of the naive moral framework that serves as a normative basis for the Su-
preme Court's aversion to criminal strict liability.
Husak begins with the general idea-as does this Note-that there
should be some correspondence between moral theory and criminal law. In
particular, he claims that criminal law should be largely governed by a
"wrongfulness constraint" that itself is derived largely from moral philoso-
phy.109 With that in mind, Husak has serious concerns for the consequences
of extending irrelevance-of-intention reasoning to criminal practice; he
claims that the disagreement among philosophers about "the role played by
mental states generally, and by intentions in particular, in evaluating the
permissibility or wrongfulness of actions" would have vast consequences
for criminal practice. 10 The law of criminal attempts, for one, would all but
cease to exist."' Negligent homicide would be indistinguishable from pre-
meditated, first-degree murder. In short, "the costs of accepting [the DDE
critics' account] throughout the substantive penal law would be enormous,
would echo throughout all of criminal law theory, and should not be paid
lightly."'2
Husak raises the possibility that severing the relation between intention
and moral permissibility would make irrelevant the moral-criminal corre-
spondence theory. Without this correspondence, the presumption against
strict liability would lose its normative justification,' and the floodgates
would open to a massive revision of criminal law. Yet, by Husak's account,
this result is precisely what recent critics of DDE implicitly endorse.
III. A (SLIGHTLY MORE NUANCED) MORAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ADDRESSING CRIMINAL STRICT LIABILITY
Part II introduced two challenges--one practical, one philosophical-
for the naive moral framework and its presumption against criminal strict
108. Husak, supra note 8, at 53 ("Exactly why these theorists are more interested in
undermining something they characterize as DDE rather than in examining [the irrelevance
of intentions] directly is a mystery I cannot resolve.").
109. Id. at 52.
110. Id. at 52-53.
111. Id. at 62-64 (discussing the importance of intentions to attempt law, and question-
ing accounts of attempts that do not refer to agents' intentions).
112. Id. at 54.
113. See supra Part 1.
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liability. This Part considers a resolution of the philosophical worry Husak
raises-a way to conceive of the na've framework as compatible with mod-
em thinking on intent. In doing so, it lays the groundwork for addressing the
practical worry of creeping criminal strict liability. Section III.A argues that
Husak has conflated a particular correspondence between law and morality
with the need for a correspondence generally. It then considers a slightly
more nuanced moral framework that accommodates modem philosophy
while squaring it with intuitions about criminal law. Section III.B applies
this new framework to the types of strict liability crimes from Section II.A.
It finds that enhanced punishment crimes are justifiable, at least in principle,
under the new framework, and suggests a revision to the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence. By resolving the philosophical worry, this Note suggests an
interpretive approach to explaining, and hopefully avoiding, troubling situa-
tions arising under Andy's Law and its analogues.
A. Saving Criminal Law from DDE's Critics
Husak is right to worry about preserving a moral-criminal correspond-
ence. However, this Section argues that the recent critics of DDE need not
reject their assessment. In truth, the claim that intentions are generally irrel-
evant to an analysis of moral permissibility does not undermine criminal law
in the way Husak suggests. This Section reconsiders Husak's argument and
unpacks a conflation of moral theory broadly and moral permissibility in
particular. It then suggests an alternate framework that incorporates
Scanlon's analysis of moral blame and that provides a moral-criminal cor-
respondence that avoids Husak's troubling conclusion. This slightly more
nuanced moral framework accommodates the critics of DDE, creates a plau-
sible correspondence between moral philosophy and criminal law that is
consistent with the nafve moral framework, and reinforces the central role of
intentions in criminal law.
1. How the Critique of DDE Does Not Undermine Criminal Law
Reconsider the conclusion, labeled CN below, that recent critiques of
DDE undermine the normative foundations that counsel against criminal
strict liability. The conclusion relies on three premises developed throughout
this Note. The first premise, labeled P1 below, is that there is some corre-
spondence between moral philosophy and criminal theory such that the
former justifies the latter's presumption against criminal strict liability. 1 4
The second premise, labeled P2 below, is that criminal law generally con-
siders, and should continue to consider, the intentions of agents when asking
whether some action merits criminal punishment." 5 The third premise, la-
beled P3 below, states that modem moral philosophers--or some substantial
or esteemed portion of them-believe that intent is irrelevant to determining
114. See supra Section I.A.
115. See supra Section I.A.
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the moral permissibility of an agent's actions. 1 6 This argument can be rep-
resented as follows:
P1. There is a correspondence between moral theory and criminal wrongdo-
ing.
P2. Agents' intentions are essential to determine whether an action is crimi-
nal-that is, whether it amounts to criminal wrongdoing.
P3. Modem moral philosophy denies that an agent's intentions determine
the moral permissibility of his actions.
CN. Rejecting intention's role in determining moral permissibility upends
criminal law's practice of determining whether an action is criminal." 7
Setting up the problem in this way makes one solution to the problem
clear. Perhaps observers conflate moral theory (in P1) with moral permissi-
bility (in P3); whereas P1 draws a connection between criminal wrongdoing
and the entire domain of moral theory, P3 connects criminal wrongdoing to
the particular concept of moral permissibility. The argument assumes that
moral permissibility, rather than some other normative concept, corresponds
with criminal wrongdoing. s18 Of course, there could be some other moral
concept for which intention is relevant, and that concept could be the moral
principle to which criminal wrongdoing corresponds. Consider then the fol-
lowing additional premise:
P4. There exists some correspondence between moral theory and criminal
wrongdoing other than that between moral permissibility and criminal
wrongdoing.
The mere possibility of P4 does not go far in defusing Husak's concerns; at
best, it allows for the possibility that CN does not follow deductively from
P1-P3. Logical possibility, however, is a low bar to clear.
An alternative correspondence theory would bolster the argument that
modem moral philosophy poses merely an apparent threat. Unfortunately,
the naive moral framework relied on throughout this Note is not robust
enough to accomplish this purpose. While grounded on intuitions about the
nature of punishment and the special status of criminal law," 9 the naive
moral framework paints a story of the nature of intention that is simply too
rudimentary to ameliorate Husak's worry. What is needed, then, is a more
nuanced moral framework that corresponds with criminal wrongdoing even
116. See supra Section I1.B.
117. This presentation is similar to, and inspired by, Walen's exposition of Husak.
Walen, supra note 19, at 71-72.
118. Stuart Green suggests "[mioral wrongfulness involves conduct that violates a
moral norm or standard." Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime To Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533,
1551 (1997). Further, he distinguishes wrongfulness from both harmfulness and culpability;
the three moral concepts figure heavily into normative analyses of criminal law, and the con-
cepts are both "analytically distinct," id. at 1552, and not "entirely separable," id. at 1553.
119. See supra Section I.A.
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while preserving the important role played by intentions in determining
some type of criminal wrongdoing.
As it turns out, Scanlon's recent work on moral blame suggests a viable
alternative correspondence. Moreover, Scanlon introduces his account of
blame at the same time that he refutes DDE in precisely the way Husak
finds objectionable. As such, an appeal to Scanlonian blame is not ad hoc;
the account is a natural candidate for an alternative correspondence theory.
2. Scanlonian Blame and a Slightly More Nuanced Moral Framework
A full exposition of Scanlon's project would exceed the scope of this
Note. For these purposes the focus will be how Scanlon's account can both
accommodate the criticisms of DDE and consider agents' intentions in mor-
al philosophy. The key insight is as follows: intentions can be irrelevant to
moral permissibility while still being relevant to some other moral calculus.
As it turns out, intentions are highly relevant to analyses of moral blame,
and moral blame is a more likely candidate for a normative foundation of
criminal law.
Scanlon agrees with the critics of DDE: intentions do not fundamentally
determine the permissibility of an action. 120 In inquiring why DDE never-
theless appears so appealing in certain contexts, Scanlon distinguishes
permissibility from the closely related but distinct concept of meaning.
Scanlon defines the meaning of an action as "the significance, for the agent
and others, of the agent's willingness to perform that action for the reasons
he or she does."'21 Meaning and permissibility are not exclusive but rather
independent. Scanlon states as follows:
The permissibility of an action and its meaning are interrelated.... But the
meaning of an action can vary independently of its permissibility. Injuring
you intentionally and negligently inflicting the same injury are both im-
permissible but have different meanings: the former reflects outright
hostility to your interests, the latter only a lack of sufficient care.'22
To appreciate this distinction, imagine a hypothetical person named
Flettcher, prosecuted under Andy's Law.123 Flettcher's underlying criminal
act is driving on the populated shoulder of a road under construction. Doing
so is morally impermissible, independent of why Flettcher did so. That is,
his intention-whether he swerved onto the shoulder in order to hit a work-
er or because he was being careless-is irrelevant to the question of whether
the action itself is permissible. Unlike permissibility, the meaning of an ac-
tion depends in large part on the agent's intentions (or, alternately, the
120. SCANLON, supra note 9, at 39 ("[A]lthough the idea of acting intentionally plays a
role in characterizing a particular form of morally objectionable action, it does not in this case
play a role in drawing the line between what is permissible and what is impermissible.").
121. Id. at4.
122. Id. at 55.
123. The new name is meant to distinguish the hypotheticals used here from the real-
world application of Andy's Law. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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agent's reasons for action). 24 For this example, whether Flettcher intended
to hit a worker matters; however, on Scanlon's account, it matters because
Flettcher's intentions says something about the meaning of his actions, or
the significance of his actions to those affected and to others.
125
Scanlon's account of meaning lays the groundwork for a moral concept
that is highly relevant to criminal law: blame.2 6 For Scanlon, to deem an
action as blameworthy "is to claim that the action shows something about
the agent's attitudes toward others that impairs the relations that others can
have with him or her."' 27 On this account, the meaning of an action-and
thus, the agent's reasons for acting-is highly influential in determining
whether and to what degree an action is blameworthy. 28 By contrast,
permissibility is independent of moral blame; says Scanlon, "[T]he
blameworthiness of an action depends on the reasons for which a person
acted, in ways that... impermissibility does not."'
' 29
Returning to Flettcher, it would be morally relevant whether he intended
to cause harm to a construction worker, but only because his intentions af-
fect what that impermissible act means to the parties involved. 130 Attitudes
of those affected, for example, would be entirely different if Flettcher were
careless, malicious, or entirely blameless, even if the underlying action were
consistently impermissible. The degree to which an act is blameworthy is
determined by the impairment suffered by the parties' relationship.
Moral blame improves the naYve moral framework for assessing criminal
wrongdoing. For one, notions of blameworthiness and culpability jibe with
intuitions about criminal theory that guide the initial moral framework. The
Morissette Court argued that mens rea requirements "protect those who
124. SCANLON, supra note 9, at 4 ("Although permissibility does not, in general, de-
pend on an agent's reasons for action, meaning obviously does .... ). Intentions are best
understood as a subset of reasons for action, though the conflation here is appropriate. See
id. at 10-11. Moreover, to the extent that intentions affect permissibility, Scanlon argues that
in fact it is meaning that is determining permissibility. See id. at 4.
125. See id. at 4, 13 ("The difference between causing harm intentionally and doing so
negligently, however, is not a difference in permissibility. Both are generally impermissible.
The difference between them lies, rather, in the kind of fault that is involved when an agent
acts impermissibly in these ways.").
126. Scanlon calls blame "a species of meaning." Id. at 7.
127. Id. at 128.
128. To connect more tightly Scanlon's attitudinal account of blame with intentions,
consider the following statement: "The agent's reasons for acting ... are what constitute his
attitudes toward others, and what have the implications that blame involves . I... d. at 152-
53.
129. Id. at 152.
130. It is beyond the scope of the Note to delve too deeply into the distinction between
blameworthiness-an objective, impersonal analysis-and the act of blaming, which has a
personal component based on how the meaning of an action impaired the relationship be-
tween parties. Suffice it to say, Scanlon's account creates space for a moral relationship that
all actors hold with every other actor; this creates space for moral blameworthiness and
makes sense of the idea of strangers having their relationships impaired.
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were not blameworthy in mind." 131 Likewise, the Court in Liparota enter-
tained whether through strict liability Congress "dispense[d] with the only
morally blameworthy element in the definition of the crime."'1 32 Meanwhile,
moral blameworthiness informs the idea that there is a uniquely stigmatic
nature of criminal punishment; as Hart says, "[I]t is necessary to be able to
say in good conscience in each instance [of a criminal sanction] that the
violation was blameworthy and, hence, deserving of the moral condemna-
tion of the community."' 33 At the very least, a correspondence between
moral blame and criminal culpability fits better than moral permissibility
and criminal wrongdoing. Admittedly, applying Scanlon's account of moral
blame to the criminal law could require further tinkering." 4 Still, this
framework embraces criticism of DDE while simultaneously accommodat-
ing a plausible correspondence between moral philosophy and criminal law.
Moreover, it is consistent with the naYve moral framework: intention re-
mains a central element of criminal law, and it gives content to the unique
character of criminal stigma. This slightly more nuanced moral framework
preserves a moral-criminal correspondence that justifies a strong presump-
tion against criminal strict liability.
The nuanced moral framework itself need not be accurate for that point
to stand; that plausible grounds for an alternative moral-criminal corre-
spondence exist is sufficient to make P4 a worthwhile objection to Husak's
concern.'35 Even if this particular account ultimately fails as a coherent cor-
respondence, the nuanced moral framework nevertheless strongly suggests
that alternate correspondences can exist. At a minimum, that alternative
moral-criminal correspondence theories are plausible tempers the concern
that recent critiques of DDE unwind the fundamentals of criminal law.
B. What Moral Philosophy Can Tell Us about State Action
The preceding Section gives a plausible reason to suspect that modem
moral philosophy is compatible with criminal law. With that very modest
thesis in place, it is worth considering whether to accept that the nuanced
moral framework itself. This Section considers briefly how, in addition to
resolving the philosophical worry, the nuanced moral framework can deter
131. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952) (emphasis added).
132. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 (1985).
133. Hart, supra note 29, at 412; see also, e.g., Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally
Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1511, 1527 (1992) ("[C]riminal convictions for serious nonregulatory offenses con-
vey the message that the offender was morally responsible for his crime and thus deserves
moral blame for what he has done.").
134. For example, Scanlon himself doubts that the State, as a collective agent, has the
capacity to blame. SCANLON, supra note 9, at 162. Other scholars are more sympathetic to
the idea of attributing such qualities to collective agents. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson &
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv.
1503, 1520-27 (2000); see also infra notes 144-147.
135. See supra Section III.A. 1.
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the other challenge for criminal strict liability: the creep of strict liability
crimes by state legislatures. The Section compares one type of strict liability
crimes-enhanced punishment crimes-with the problem of moral luck, a
phenomenon noticed in philosophy. The nuanced moral framework offers
some explanation for this phenomenon. It then argues that the analogy to
moral luck suggests a qualified justification for enhanced punishment
crimes. The upshot is twofold. For one, it explains prosecutions like that of
Stacy Bettcher. Second, it suggests how the interpretive jurisprudence of
criminal strict liability could be extended to handle Andy's Law and its
counterparts.
1. Moral Luck and Enhanced Punishment Crimes
Section II.A.2 identified enhanced punishment crimes as those for which
a particularly bad outcome generated a harsher treatment than would other-
wise be anticipated for the underlying crime. The claim was that the severity
of the punishments could not be justified. But it avoided a stronger claim-
that no enhanced punishments are justifiable, no matter how minor the
enhancement-in part because the notion that outcomes should determine
the punishment is both intuitively plausible and a well-established feature of
criminal law.'36 This intuition reflects the puzzle-what philosophers Ber-
nard Williams and Thomas Nagel refer to in a pair of articles as the problem
of "moral luck"137-that individuals are held culpable and punished as much
for bad luck as for morally impermissible conduct. For example, though
reckless driving that injures no one is wrong in some sense, most would
agree that reckless driving resulting in a bad outcome-death-is somehow
morally worse. 31 Our intuitions suggest that criminal law should distinguish
these two cases. However, the culpable mental states held by the drivers,
rather than features of the world beyond their control, are exactly identical.
Scanlon's account of moral blame gives some insight into this problem
of moral luck. Recall that Scanlon's notion of blame adjusts the relationship
between affected parties. 39 On his account, the actual wrongful outcome, as
distinct from the mere possibility of wrongful outcome, plays "a special role
in making blame ... appropriate." 4' Notwithstanding the fact that bad luck
136. For an obvious example, consider that the only distinction between certain in-
stances of attempted homicide and homicide is the outcome.
137. T. Nagel, Moral Luck, in 50 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, SUP-
PLEMENTARY VOLUME 137, 140 (1976), reprinted in THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS
24, 38 (Canto ed. 1991) The focus of this Note is on a species of moral luck concerning
moral assessments based, in part, on results beyond the control of the moral agent. Id.;
B.A.O. Williams, Moral Luck, in 50 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, SUPPLE-
MENTARY VOLUME, supra, at 115, reprinted in Bernard Williams, MORAL LUCK:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, at 20 (1981).
138. See generally Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 3,
2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-luckl.
139. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
140. SCANLON, supra note 9, at 158-59.
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explains the different outcome between two otherwise identically reckless
drivers, on Scanlon's account the bad outcome "multiplies the significance
of his fault" for the relationship of those parties affected. 4' A bad outcome
is the base from which injured parties derive the meaning of an offender's
act. It anchors the assessment of meaning 42 and thus the determination of
an action as blameworthy. The same action becomes more blameworthy
where it produces a bad outcome; the unlucky reckless driver has done more
than the lucky one has to negatively affect any relationship with the injured
party.
The nuanced moral framework, then, has a possible justification for one
of the two classes of strict liability crimes now popular with state legisla-
tures. This approach suggests that, under the more nuanced moral
framework, enhanced punishment crimes may be morally justifiable, at least
in principle. At the very least, the nuanced moral framework creates space
for some degree of justifiable enhanced punishment crimes.' 43 By contrast,
this account fails entirely for the examples of unrelated conduct crimes seen
in Section II.A. 1. It is not clear what it would be for the meaning of one
action to be affected by the occurrence of an outcome that is, by definition,
entirely unrelated. Accordingly, exactly one class of strict liability crimes is
consistent with a strict liability moral framework.
2. An Updated Interpretive Presumption against
Criminal Strict Liability
If the nuanced moral framework offers the basis of justification for an
additional class of criminal strict liability, it can help explain what goes
wrong in some prosecutions and how courts can respond in the future.
Courts can limit strict liability crimes to be consistent with their interpreta-
tion of legislative intent. Specifically, courts should use the nuanced moral
framework to inform the following rule of statutory interpretation: allow
criminal strict liability for statutes that create enhanced punishment crimes,
but require a mens rea element for statutes that create unrelated conduct
crimes. The remainder of this Section sketches out this proposed rule, con-
siders some objections, and refines the rule accordingly.
Recall the presumption against strict liability crimes. Central to the Su-
preme Court's practice of interpreting statutes to include a mens rea
requirement was the notion that courts should not forgo a mens rea require-
ment unless some moral justification exists.'" The nuanced moral
framework does nothing to abandon this central insight. However, the nu-
anced moral framework gives new insight into a class of strict liability laws
that are morally justifiable; such fine-grained distinctions were not clearly
141. Id. at 150.
142. See id. at 159.
143. That is not to say, of course, that all examples in Section II.A.2 are thereby moral-
ly right. See infra Section III.B.2.
144. See supra Part I.
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accessible under the naive framework. Insofar as enhanced punishment
crimes are defensible under the presumption against criminal strict liability,
courts should recognize strict liability for enhanced punishment crimes. By
contrast, unrelated conduct crimes are not compatible with the Court's
presumption, even under the nuanced moral framework; courts should not
interpret such statutes to forgo a mens rea requirement.
Two objections come to mind. First, certain enhanced punishment
crimes still seem unjustifiable as strict liability crimes. Second, the distinc-
tion between enhanced punishment crimes and unrelated conduct crimes is
likely not as stark as assumed in its treatment here. These objections are
considered in turn.
First, some will argue that not all enhanced punishment crimes seem to
merit criminal strict liability. Even if enhanced punishment crimes are justi-
fiable in principle, particular punitive enhancements required by statute
exceed justifiable limits to additional punishment. Indeed, those examples
from Section II.A.2 press the idea that strict liability is inappropriate for
grossly enhanced punishments. That said, courts could employ the nuanced
moral framework more deeply to consider whether crimes with grossly en-
hanced punishments are distinguishable from crimes with mildly enhanced
punishments. Such a project is beyond the scope of this Note, but extending
Scanlon's account of blame seems to be a relatively straightforward task.
145
Second, one would be forgiven for thinking that the distinction drawn
between enhanced punishment and unrelated conduct is artificial. Recall
Bettcher and Flettcher: Bettcher was prosecuted under Andy's Law for a
death that resulted while she violated an unrelated driving restriction,
146
while Flettcher was prosecuted under Andy's Law for a death in a construc-
tion zone resulting from his negligence.147 If punishment in the latter case is,
in principle, morally defensible under the nuanced moral framework, 148 pun-
ishment in the former case is not: nothing about Bettcher's intention informs
the meaning of her actions such that blame could be attributed. But as this
comparison makes clear, Andy's Law doesn't distinguish between the types
of strict liability. The statute covers both equally. Moreover, it is not obvious
that Andy's Law is simply poorly drafted in this respect; fact patterns for
enhanced punishment laws could be imagined to look more like unrelated
conduct crimes, and vice versa. The distinction between classes of laws may
better be understood merely as a way of distinguishing between particular
prosecutions. 1
49
145. This response likely credits too much the extent to which courts engage with mor-
al philosophy when considering criminal law. After all, this Note has already endorsed a
modestly pragmatic view that the correspondence between moral philosophy and criminal
law is a fuzzy one. See supra Section I.A.
146. See supra notes 1-5, 69-71 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
148. See supra Section III.B.1.
149. This insight might explain why prosecutions like Bettcher's occur. It is not simply
that a law exists under which prosecution is possible; it is also the case that the difference
between a morally justifiable prosecution and a morally unjustifiable one is subtle and not
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This is a harder problem to address. To continue the example, courts
could not interpret Andy's Law to contain a mens rea element for Bettcher
but not for Flettcher. Nevertheless, something like this approach could still
inform the interpretive presumption. In interpreting a criminal statute, courts
should consider whether legislators had in mind enhanced punishment
crimes or unrelated conduct crimes. That is, courts should consider whether
the legislature intended either to curtail related activities with bad outcomes
or to curtail unrelated activities. If they believe that a legislature aimed to
enhance punishment for bad outcomes, they should be reluctant to read in a
mens rea requirement where none exists. However, they should continue the
Supreme Court's practice of finding a mens rea requirement where state
legislatures seek to hold parties strictly liable for unrelated conduct. With
this clarification in mind, the nuanced moral framework's rule of construc-
tive interpretation can be restated: allow criminal strict liability for statutes
that can be understood to create enhanced punishment crimes, but require a
mens rea element for statutes that can be understood to create unrelated
conduct crimes.
This new rule of statutory interpretation is consistent with courts' read-
ing in nonexistent mens rea requirements. 50 The nuanced moral framework
at once expands the scope of justifications for criminal strict liability and
delineates relatively clear standards according to which strict liability could
be expanded to cover new crimes. Courts following the framework could
make sense of some recent state action, while offering a way to constrain
those laws consistent with its longstanding interpretive moral presumption.
CONCLUSION
The law should continue to recognize its longstanding presumption
against criminal strict liability. This Note suggests that this longstanding
presumption is rooted in moral intuitions about intention and criminal pun-
ishment, and is tempered by the proper interpretive role of the judiciary. It
argues that two seemingly unrelated challenges to this approach to criminal
strict liability can be brought together to adopt a framework that is at once
more robust and more sophisticated. A slightly more nuanced moral frame-
work can both accommodate recent thinking about intention and preserve
the relationship between moral theory and criminal law underwriting the
presumption against criminal strict liability. Moreover, understanding the
contours of that moral framework informs how judicial interpretive practice
could simultaneously adapt to and constrain the expansion of criminal strict
liability laws.
obvious from the statute itself. Prosecutions like those of Bettcher may simply be those of
moral error. Of course, as this Note suggests elsewhere, pragmatic and (crassly) political
motivations may equally inform why such prosecutions occur. See supra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text; Section II.A.
150. See supra notes 40-47.
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